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Mitchell M. Gans, Bridget J.  Crawford & Jonathan G. 
Blattmachr 
The Estate Tax Fundamentals of Celebrity and 
Control 
We previously suggested in this Journal that post-death publicity rights 
could be excluded from the decedent’s estate for tax purposes if state legislation 
precluded the decedent from exercising post-death control.1 In other words, if 
state legislation designated who would hold these rights after the decedent’s 
death, the value of these rights should not be subject to estate tax. Professor 
Joshua Tate, in his response to our essay, argues that under current law, estate 
tax inclusion would be required regardless of the decedent’s ability to exercise 
control.2 So, for example, in Professor Tate’s analysis, the estate tax would 
apply even if the legislation vested those rights in the decedent’s oldest 
daughter and even if the decedent had no right to alter this outcome. Professor 
Tate’s analysis misconstrues fundamental estate tax principles and 
misunderstands the precedents on which he relies.3 
Let’s start with a bedrock principle that Professor Tate ignores: estate tax 
inclusion under § 2033 is not appropriate unless the decedent has the right to 
control the post-death disposition of the interest.4 Prior to the decision in 
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,5 the treatment of wrongful death 
 
1.  Mitchell M. Gans, Bridget J. Crawford & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Postmortem Rights of 
Publicity: The Federal Estate Tax Consequences of New State-Law Property Rights, 117 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 203 (2008), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/04/01/ganscrawfordblattmachr.html. 
2.  Joshua C. Tate, Marilyn Monroe’s Legacy: Taxation of Postmortem Publicity Rights, 118 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 38 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/2008/09/08/tate.html. 
3.  Others have recognized that publicity rights cannot be included in a decedent’s estate, 
absent post-death control. See Paul L. Caron, Estate Planning Implications of the Right of 
Publicity, 68 TAX NOTES 95, 95 (1995) (“The only question thus is whether the right of 
publicity is . . . descendible to the decedent's heirs.”). 
4.  See, e.g., Estate of Wadewitz v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 925, 933 (1963), aff’d, 339 F.2d 980 (7th 
Cir. 1964). 
5.  465 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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recoveries for estate tax purposes was uncontroversial. Because the decedent 
typically could not control the disposition of the damages, there could be no 
inclusion for federal estate tax purposes. 
In Connecticut Bank, the decedent’s executor recovered damages under 
Connecticut’s wrongful death statute. Unlike traditional wrongful death laws, 
the Connecticut statute allowed the decedent to determine who received the 
benefits. Distinguishing earlier administrative rulings,6 the IRS argued in its 
brief that the damages should be included in the estate because the decedent 
could control their disposition.7 The court held that, despite the decedent’s 
control, the damages were not taxable because the decedent lacked any 
ownership rights in the recovery during life.8 It did not reject the universally 
accepted principle that § 2033 applies only where the decedent has the ability to 
exercise post-death control. Rather, the court, in effect, held that such control 
is necessary but not sufficient for estate tax inclusion under § 2033. 
To be sure, after Connecticut Bank, a decedent’s ability to control the 
disposition of a wrongful death recovery is no longer critical. Where the statute 
does not give the decedent the ability to control the recovery, it is excluded 
from the gross estate on that ground. And if the decedent does have such 
control, as under the Connecticut statute, it is still excluded because the claim 
did not accrue during the decedent’s life. But–contrary to Professor Tate’s 
reading–the Connecticut Bank decision does not alter the bedrock principle that 
§ 2033 can apply only where the decedent has post-death control. 
Professor Tate’s reading is inconsistent with the received understanding of 
§ 2033 and its settled application in other contexts. To illustrate, consider 
Kramer v. United States.9 In Kramer, the decedent had an employment contract 
that entitled him to receive a fixed weekly amount during his lifetime. Upon 
his death, a substitute amount ($150 per week) became payable to his spouse. 
The IRS sought to include in the decedent’s gross estate the value of the post-
death right conferred on the spouse. The court rejected the IRS’s argument on 
the grounds that the decedent’s rights terminated at his death and therefore he 
could not control–that is, could not alter–the spouse’s rights. Relying on the 
 
6.  The government cited Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179; Rev. Rul. 56-637, 1956-2 C.B. 600; 
E.T. 18, 1940-2 C.B. 285; Rev. Rul. 68-88, 1968-1 C.B. 397; and Rev. Rul. 69-8, 1969-1 C.B. 
219. Brief of the Appellee at 12-14, Conn. Bank, 465 F.2d 760 (Nos. 561, 562, 563, Dockets 
71-1964, 71-1965 and 71-1966). 
7.  Brief of the Appellee, supra note 6, at 14-17. 
8.  Conn. Bank, 465 F.2d at 763. 
9.  406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
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Tax Court’s decision in Estate of Wadewitz v. Commissioner,10 the Kramer court 
stated: 
 
The decedent’s interest in the employment contract ceased at his 
death. He was entitled to be paid a salary as long as he was employed 
by the Company but nothing beyond that. Decedent had no right to the 
$150 per week payments and no control over them. As the Tax Court 
said in Estate of Wadewitz . . . : 
“* * * It is well established, * * * that where a decedent holds only a 
property interest which terminates at his death, * * * such an interest 
cannot be reached by section 2033 * * * and is not includable 
thereunder in the decedent’s gross estate. * * *” 
We think that the interest Abraham Kramer had in his employment 
agreement was terminable and therefore the property also is not 
includable under Section 2033.11 
 
Kramer is not aberrational. Rather, it is consistent with the inveterate 
notion that § 2033 does not apply where the decedent has an interest in a trust 
that terminates at death. In such a case, as in Kramer, the decedent’s interest 
evaporates at death, leaving the decedent with no post-death control and 
making estate tax inclusion under § 2033 inappropriate.12 Kramer is, of course, 
also consistent with the pre-Connecticut Bank authorities, which exclude 
wrongful death recoveries from the estate based on the decedent’s inability to 
exercise post-death control. 
Not able to cite any affirmative authority to support his assertion that post-
death control is irrelevant to estate tax inclusion, Professor Tate poses this 
question: if post-death control is truly essential, how does one explain the 
treatment of a decedent who is required under Louisiana law to give a portion 
of the estate to children under the age of twenty-four? To the extent that such 
rights do not diminish the value of the estate, it is based on a narrow regulatory 
exception to the pervasive general rule, which is that inclusion hinges on post-
death control.13 Indeed, were it otherwise, § 2034 of the Code–which provides, 
in effect, that the decedent’s inability to control the surviving spouse’s curtesy- 
 
10.  39 T.C. 925 (1963), aff’d, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964). 
11.  Kramer, 406 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (citing Wadewitz, 39 T.C. at 933). 
12.  See Wadewitz, 39 T.C. at 933-35 (indicating that where a decedent’s ability to enjoy an 
interest in property terminates at death and then reemerges in another person, § 2033 cannot 
apply because it is not “transferrable through his estate either by will or by intestacy”). 
13.  See Estate of Johnson v. Comm’r, 718 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1983); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 86-51-001 (Aug. 8, 1986). 
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or dower-type rights does not result in a diminution of the estate–would be 
superfluous. 
Professor Tate’s analysis prompts two final comments. First, the 
implication in his essay that legislation conferring publicity rights might cause 
estate tax inclusion for a decedent dying prior to the enactment of the 
legislation is inconsistent with the holding in Connecticut Bank. As two of us 
have discussed elsewhere,14 Connecticut Bank and other authorities make clear 
that an interest in property that is not legally enforceable at the moment of 
death is excluded from the estate on this ground. Thus, if a celebrity were to 
die before state law permitted the enforcement of post-death publicity rights, 
any subsequently enacted legislation could not cause federal estate tax inclusion 
in that decedent’s gross estate. 
Second, as Professor Tate indicates, we did suggest that revised legislation 
could confer on a celebrity the right to extinguish post-death rights without 
necessarily causing estate tax inclusion. Professor Tate argues that the 
celebrity’s ability to eliminate the rights of the people designated in the statute 
surely translates into estate tax inclusion. Yet, in Kramer, the decedent could 
have defeated his wife’s rights by terminating his employment (or perhaps by 
divorcing his wife), and the court nonetheless held that § 2033 did not apply.15 
While we did not, and do not, take a definitive position on this question, we 
disagree with Professor Tate’s suggestion that the law is unequivocally to the 
contrary.16 
In sum, post-death control is an essential prerequisite for estate tax 
inclusion under § 2033. In its absence, the section cannot as a general rule 
apply. In suggesting that publicity rights are somehow not subject to this 
requirement, Professor Tate misreads the significance of Connecticut Bank and 
ignores well-engrained principles of tax law. 
 
 
14.  See Mitchell M. Gans, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Austin Bramwell, Estate Tax Exemption 
Portability: What Should the IRS Do? And What Should Planners Do in the Interim?, 42 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413, 425-26, n.43, 427-28, n.45 (2007). In a future article, we intend to 
further explore the expectancy concept.  
15.  Cf. Rev. Rul. 80-255, 1980-2 C.B. 272 (indicating that the kind of control on which estate tax 
inclusion can be predicated is not necessarily present where the scope of the decedent’s 
control is circumscribed). While this ruling deals with §§ 2036 and 2038, rather than § 2033, 
it does suggest that a decedent may not be viewed as having control for estate tax purposes if 
the decedent’s ability to exercise it is limited. 
16.  For a discussion of the impact of a decedent’s direction to destroy property, see Ray D. 
Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate Taxes and the Compelled Commodification of Identity, 17 VA. 
TAX REV. 759, 786-89 (1998) (critiquing reasoning in Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 
F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
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